This article challenges both the "gentlemanly capitalist" thesis and "official mind" interpretation of the 1882 British occupation of Egypt. The former fails to adequately consider the political character of the Anglo-French financial Control overturned by the Urabist revolt in February 1882. The latter overstates the significance of the Suez Canal as both trigger and justification for military intervention. The article argues that the primary motivation behind the Egyptian occupation was the vindication of British prestige, vis-à-vis the Continental Powers, but especially in India and in the "East" by suppressing the threat to "civilised" order posed by the Urabist revolt. The protection of the Suez Canal and British financial and trade interests were secondary and derivative.
3 partially sustainable. The following analysis focuses primarily on the acute phase of the Egyptian crisis from 9 September 1881 until Cairo was occupied on 15 September 1882. The evidence cited herein strongly implies that Egypt's international financial obligations, and the safety of the Canal, the threat to which was doubtful even at the time, could have been secured by making terms with Urabi.
11 Indeed, by late June 1882, the Continental Powers were treating Urabi's nationalist regime as an accomplished fact. This course of action would have been consistent with the Gladstonian foreign policy principles laid out in the Midlothian election campaign of 1879, which, as counter to Disraeli-Toryism, stressed the equality of nations and respect for the will of "civilised" Europe. 12 The article argues that the primary motive behind the Egyptian occupation was the vindication of British prestige, vis-à-vis the Continental Powers, but especially in India and the East, by suppressing the threat to "civilised" order posed by the Urabist revolt. The protection of the Suez Canal and British financial and trade interests were secondary and derivative.
The adamant British refusals to treat with Urabi, in opposition to the other Powers and contrary to Liberal principles, suggest that other motives were at play at the height of the Egyptian crisis. Harrison has also made the connection between public opinion and imperial prestige, and argued that the main purpose of the Egypt occupation was to safeguard India. This article also shares Harrison 14 In pursuit of its Egypt policy, Gladstone's Liberal Cabinet was forced to seek a precarious balance between dual imperatives, which at the time resulted in accusations of vacillation and indecisiveness in the press and by the Opposition. The need to vindicate British prestige, reinforced by a vociferous public opinion, had to be accommodated with the acute prudential concern of placing the Egyptian Question before a Conference of the Powers. The three elements of the argument presented here: prestige, prudence and public opinion were initially in tension with one another, but ultimately were mutually reinforcing in the Cabinet's decision to occupy Egypt and in its timing. Imperial strategy required that the government maintain British prestige by putting down the revolt in Egypt while prudently avoiding conflict with the other Powers. Reinforcing these imperatives was the public opinion requirement that locations deemed essential to the prosperity and prestige of the Empire be seen to be orderly and safe. Or, in the words of Robinson and Gallagher, it was incumbent on British governments to "respect the public's thirst for peace, economy and prestige" in conducting imperial policy. German press was claiming that Egyptian proceedings were of the greatest importance for all Europe. The press, public opinion and prudence
The delay suggests that factors other than prestige were also exerting an influence on Cabinet decisionmaking at the height of the Egyptian crisis.
This section outlines the symbiotic relationship between policy elites in London, British officials abroad, the reporting of foreign corespondents, and perceptions of public opinion in the late-Victorian era. It then demonstrates that, rather than vacillation and indecisiveness, the delay in Cabinet decision-making in the first half of 1882 was primarily a function of the tension between the prudence required by the exigencies of European power politics, and on the other hand, the escalating pressures for armed intervention expressed by a vociferous press and public opinion.
British press and public opinion began to pay greater attention to the Egyptian press. 50 The importance of mobilising public opinion against political rivals was first recognised and manipulated in a concerted fashion by Disraeli and Gladstone in the 1870s. Large amounts of daily press coverage were allocated to political reporting and parliamentary debates were published in full. The influence of newspapers and editors in the political process was thus very significant, as this was the predominant means of communication between political elites and the mass of the population.
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Prior to the advent of opinion polling, the temper of public sentiment was, however, difficult to gauge. In the late-Victorian era, perceptions of public opinion were mediated into the Cabinet decision-making process through the views of parliamentarians, but more importantly, by the tone and disposition of the masscirculation press, which, however inaccurately, was considered synonymous with public opinion. 52 No suggestion is made here that British governments were led by public opinion. Rather, perceptions of public opinion tended to function as a negative constraint on policymakers, precluding government inaction on highly publicised issues. 53 In foreign affairs reporting, correspondents worked very closely with British representatives abroad, and in some cases were one and the same. This consideration became increasingly salient.
As greater pressure was applied to regain political control in Egypt, the "financial" disorder developed into physical disorder threatening European lives and property, which further inflamed press and public opinion in Britain. 66 According to British representatives, the purpose of this was to coerce the approval of the Chamber to dethrone the Khedive for a military dictatorship led by Urabi.
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In formulating a policy of intervention, the Cabinet was confronted with three conflicting imperatives. The first was the prudential concern that any change to the status quo in Egypt, and therefore to the "Eastern Question", be placed under the jurisdiction of a European Concert. The second was that of maintaining, as far as possible, the liberal entente with France. The third was that, as the crisis continued to escalate, the perception of damage to British prestige vis-à-vis the Continental
Powers, but particularly in India and the East, became of paramount concern. to serve prudential purposes rather than achieve any effective outcome. intervention, which would be strictly limited to one month only, was the restoration of the status quo ante Urabi. 82 That this impossibly stringent time frame was imposed casts significant doubt on the seriousness of this proposal. This is especially so when viewed in conjunction with the evidence that Northbrook was concurrently "making preparations for the naval force required to hold the Canal", while Hartington was making preparations with Lord Ripon, Viceroy of India, "to have a Brigade ready to send to Suez". 83 In the weeks following the Alexandria massacre, the question of prestige acquired an urgency that increased in parallel with the delay and ineffectiveness of the
Conference. Granville's invitation for regulated Turkish intervention was refused by
Germany on 16 June 1882 because the French had yet to acquiesce and the conditions were so severe that Bismarck was unwilling to pressure the Sultan to accept them.
It would seem that the British pressure for Turkish intervention was disingenuous, serving the prudential function of being seen to consult, while in the background military preparations were carried on. 84 Reports also suggested that the French Prime Minister, Charles de Freycinet, could not countenance Turkish intervention or his precarious government would fall. 85 On the same day, telegrams from Cairo reported that, under pressure from the German and Austrian Consuls, the Khedive was treating with Urabi by forming an agreeable Ministry, 86 Urabi, but that the defence of British "honour" and "interests" meant "it is not possible for us". 88 Dufferin was issued new instructions to take to the Conference on 21 June. The Ministry in Egypt could not be accepted. If the Sultan was unwilling to send troops, the Powers were to be asked "to provide or sanction a military intervention, other than Turkish, under their authority". 89 On the same day, the Cabinet resolved in secrecy to make preparations for the protection of the Suez Canal without reference to the Conference. 90 The Commander of the British naval squadron, Admiral Seymour, telegraphed on 22 June that all British subjects who wished to leave Egypt had been embarked, thereby removing "the principal cause of anxiety in calculating what action should be taken".
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While secret contingency planning had been taking place at the War Office since at least the end of May, reports in the press on 24 June from sources "close to government", that a "large force" was being put in readiness "for immediate deployment in Egypt", suggests that pressure from public opinion was starting to bite. forts, while the French fleet had withdrawn. 100 In the wake of the bombardment, Urabi's forces withdrew from Alexandria; reportedly leaving the burning city at the mercy of escaped convicts and mob violence. 101 Atrocities against Christians were luridly recounted in the British press. 102 The ultimatum and bombardment was not portrayed as an act of self-defence, which was the official motive, but rather as retribution for the massacres of 11 June, and a vindication of British prestige in the Orient. According to The Daily Telegraph, Britain had suffered "'Asia laughing us to scorn, while we wait upon the pleasure and leisure of Europe'". It would be "'with an outburst of angry satisfaction that Englishmen would hear at last the voice of the Queen's cannon opening on the Alexandrian murderers'". 103 The Times expressed the similar desire that the bombardment, marking one month since the Alexandria massacre, would "prove the day of retribution". Gladstone argued that the effect that an unavenged massacre of that kind "would have had upon the security, not only of all Englishmen and all British subjects, but of all European people throughout the whole East", was inestimable. 105 Dilke further elaborated that it must be perfectly clear that, by massacres of this kind, European life throughout the whole of the East is endangered, and the effect of any such massacre being passed over without redress, would be to put the lives of Europeans throughout the East absolutely at the mercy of a fanatical mob of Mahomedans. We ought to remember not only the enormous number of
British subjects who live in Egypt and abroad, but the immense interests which our country possesses, and which were protected during late years by the sanctity of European life observed throughout the East. also confirmed on the same day that it would be willing to participate with Britain but not in any arrangement that included France. 109 As these contradictions among the Powers at the Conference played themselves out to a standstill, the drumbeat in the British press demanding action reached a crescendo that no elected government could fail to heed. The tempo and urgency of the press coverage after the bombardment served to reinforce Cabinet decision-making toward unilateral intervention. In fixating on the "atrocities" and "massacres" inflicted on Europeans and other Christians in Alexandria, 110 foreign affairs' reporting fully engaged the public's concern for imperial order. For example,
The Daily Telegraph sensationally recounted that "the Arabs" had killed "all the Christians they could find". 111 The scene at Alexandria was a "ghastly catastrophe", with the ancient city in ruins, "pillaged by Egyptian soldiers and Arab mobs". 112 The press coverage reached a crescendo in the days leading up to and during the four-night parliamentary debate that gained fiscal approval for the military expedition. On 21
July 1882, the Evening News reported that more Europeans had been murdered, with "further massacres imminent". 113 Both the News of the World and The Daily News carried stories on the following days that the mass murder of Christians was spreading from Alexandria to Cairo, Port Said and elsewhere.
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The case for British intervention
The case for a unilateral British intervention was made before both Houses of Parliament starting on 24 July 1882. In the Lords, Granville confirmed that there was no remedy to the situation without the application of force. The Powers would not give formal mandates, but Granville was convinced of "their good will, their good wishes" and "their moral support". Granville also made the crucial point of prudence.
This confidence would not "have been felt either by France or by the other powers if, three or four months ago, by a precipitate course, we had taken sole action upon ourselves. At this moment, however, Europe is entirely prepared for such a contingency".
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Later in the House of Commons, Gladstone and other Ministers defended their policy largely on realist grounds. The government had "no desire to impart a shock to the fabric of the Ottoman Empire", and had firstly sought the intervention of Turkey as legitimate Suzerain. The Cabinet's next desire had been to make prudent "appeal to the common authority of Europe, and to avoid, above all things, the exhibition of a disposition of a line of isolated action". Gladstone argued that the government had "laboured hard to bring together the Conference", but had failed to gain a mandate, although it claimed to enjoy "the moral support and concurrence of Europe". France would go no further than the Canal. But, in clearly indicating the derivative nature of the Suez Canal, Gladstone then asserted that "the insecurity of the Canal is a symptom only, and the seat of the disease is in the interior of Egypt, in its disturbed and its anarchical condition".
116
Both Dilke and Joseph Chamberlain developed this theme further and explicitly asserted that the motive for restoring order in Egypt was the maintenance of British prestige in the East. Dilke argued, "it is impossible to permanently acquiesce in any arrangement in Egypt, especially after the massacre at Alexandria on the 11th
This shows that in Gladstone's understanding, it was the restoration of imperial order that was the primary object of the intervention. 115 Hansard, 24 July 1882, Vol. 272, Lords, 1493-1494. 116 Ibid., Commons, 1582-1586.
of June, which would destroy, not only the influence and credit of this country, but of all Europe in the East. 117 Chamberlain said that he could not "conceive anything more dangerous to the security of our people and to the security of our Possessions that an idea should get abroad that we could be set at defiance with impunity". 118 Both Childers and Gladstone elaborated the crucial prudential argument on the final night of the debate. Childers pointed out, "if we had adopted a different course we should have had serious difficulties with France … In all probability we should have run the risk of a serious war …" 119 In his final remarks, the Prime Minister made clear that a realist ethic of prudence had guided Cabinet decision-making throughout the Egyptian crisis. Gladstone concluded that "our greatest and most imperative duty in approaching this question of Egypt … [was] that under no consideration could that local difficulty be allowed to grow into a … European war". The result of an early break with France would have "been a sharp conflict in Egypt, where the two countries would have been divided into separate camps, and, as I believe, a general European war". 120 On 29 July 1882, the French government was defeated on a Bill of Credit for its participation in the protection of the Suez Canal and took no further part. 121 Advice from British Ambassadors on the Continent was that Germany and Austria would not oppose an intervention, but neither would they sanction it. 122 The way to a unilateral British intervention was finally cleared on 2 August when Russia declined any active opposition.
army was defeated at Tel-el-Kebir on 13 September. Cairo was occupied and Urabi captured two days later. for Turkish intervention and then a European-mandated action became increasingly disingenuous. The Conference, which the evidence suggests was always viewed as
Conclusion

